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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
TAMARA FIELDS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
TWITTER, INC., 
Defendant. 
 
Case No. 16-cv-00213-WHO    
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Re: Dkt. No. 27 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In November 2015, Lloyd “Carl” Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach were shot and killed 
while working as United States government contractors at a law enforcement training center in 
Amman, Jordan.  The shooter was a Jordanian police officer who had been studying at the center.  
In subsequent statements, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) claimed responsibility for 
the attack, describing the gunman as a “lone wolf.”  Plaintiffs, the wife of Fields and the wife and 
children of Creach, seek to hold defendant Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) liable under 18 U.S.C. § 
2333(a), part of the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), on the theory that Twitter provided material 
support to ISIS by allowing ISIS to sign up for and use Twitter accounts, and that this material 
support was a proximate cause of the November 2015 shooting.   
Twitter moves to dismiss on several grounds, including that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by 
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  As horrific as these deaths were, 
under the CDA Twitter cannot be treated as a publisher or speaker of ISIS’s hateful rhetoric and is 
not liable under the facts alleged.  Twitter’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend.  
BACKGROUND 
 In 2015, Fields and Creach travelled to Jordan through their work as government 
contractors.  First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 71-72 (“FAC”) (Dkt. No. 21).  Both had served as law 
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enforcement officers in the United States, and both were assigned to the International Police 
Training Center (“IPTC”), a facility in Amman run by the United States Department of State.  Id. 
¶ 73.   
One of the men studying at the IPTC was Anwar Abu Zaid, a Jordanian police captain.  Id. 
¶ 76.  On November 9, 2015, Abu Zaid smuggled an assault rifle and two handguns into the IPTC 
and shot and killed Fields, Creach, and three other individuals.  Id. ¶ 78.  ISIS subsequently 
“claimed responsibility” for the attack, describing Abu Zaid as a “lone wolf” and stating, 
Do not provoke the Muslims more than this, especially recruited and 
supporters of the Islamic State. The more your aggression against 
the Muslims, the more our determination and revenge . . . [T]ime 
will turn thousands of supporters of the caliphate on Twitter and 
others to wolves. 
Id. ¶ 80.   
Plaintiffs do not allege that ISIS recruited or communicated with Abu Zaid over Twitter, 
that ISIS or Abu Zaid used Twitter to plan, carry out, or raise funds for the attack, or that Abu 
Zaid ever viewed ISIS-related content on Twitter or even had a Twitter account.  The only 
arguable connection between Abu Zaid and Twitter alleged in the FAC is that Abu Zaid’s brother 
told reporters that Abu Zaid had been very moved by ISIS’s execution of Jordanian pilot Maaz al-
Kassasbeh in February 2015.  Id. ¶ 84.  After capturing al-Kassasbeh, ISIS launched a Twitter 
campaign “to crowd source ideas for his method of execution.”  Id.  ISIS subsequently used a 
Twitter account to distribute a 22-minute video of al-Kassasbeh’s horrific killing.  Id.  Plaintiffs do 
not allege that Abu Zaid ever viewed the video, either on Twitter or by any other means. 
   Plaintiffs accuse Twitter of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), part of the ATA, by knowingly 
providing material support to ISIS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.  
FAC ¶¶ 87-90 (Count 1, section 2339A), 91-94 (count 2, section 2339B).  Section 2333(a) 
provides: 
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, 
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, 
or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any 
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover 
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including attorney’s fees. 
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 47   Filed 08/10/16   Page 2 of 15
 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tr
ic
t o
f 
C
al
if
or
ni
a 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).  Sections 2339A and 2339B prohibit the knowing provision of “material 
support or resources” for terrorist activities or foreign terrorist organizations.  18 U.S.C. §§ 
2339A(a), 2339B(a)(1).  The term “material support or resources” is defined to include “any 
property, tangible or intangible, or service,” including “communications equipment.”  18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2339A(b)(1), 2339B(g)(4).   
 Plaintiffs assert that Twitter’s “provision of material support to ISIS was a proximate cause 
of [their] injur[ies].”  FAC ¶¶ 89, 93.  They allege that Twitter “has knowingly permitted . . . ISIS 
to use its social network as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and attracting 
new recruits,” and that “[t]his material support has been instrumental to the rise of ISIS and has 
enabled it to carry out numerous terrorist attacks, including the November 9, 2015 shooting attack 
in Amman, Jordan in which [Fields and Creach] were killed.”  Id. ¶ 1.   
Specifically, plaintiffs contend that ISIS uses Twitter to disseminate its official media 
publications and other content, thereby “spread[ing] propaganda and incit[ing] fear [through] 
graphic photos and videos of its terrorist feats.”  Id. ¶¶ 35-36.  ISIS also uses Twitter “to raise 
funds for its terrorist activities,” id. ¶ 30, and to “post instructional guidelines and promotional 
videos,” id. ¶ 23.   
In addition, ISIS uses Twitter as a recruitment platform, “reach[ing] potential recruits by 
maintaining accounts on Twitter so that individuals across the globe can reach out to [ISIS] 
directly.”  Id. ¶ 20.  “After first contact, potential recruits and ISIS recruiters often communicate 
via Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities.”1  Id.  Plaintiffs allege that “[t]hrough its use of 
Twitter, ISIS has recruited more than 30,000 foreign recruits over the last year.”  Id. ¶ 29.  
Plaintiffs cite a number of media reports from between 2011 and 2014 concerning ISIS’s 
use of Twitter and Twitter’s “refusal to take any meaningful action to stop it.”  Id. ¶¶ 48-56.  They 
also describe several attempts by members of the public and United States government to persuade 
Twitter to crack down on ISIS’s use of its services.  Id. ¶¶ 57-62.  They allege that, while Twitter 
has now instituted a rule prohibiting threats of violence and the promotion of terrorism, “many 
                                                 
1 Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities allow Twitter users to communicate privately through 
messages that can be seen only by the people included on them.  FAC ¶ 20.  
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ISIS-themed accounts are still easily found on Twitter.”  Id. ¶ 70. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in 
order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted).  
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.  Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 
2001).  “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable 
legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”  Mendiondo v. Centinela 
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).  While a complaint “need not contain 
detailed factual allegations” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “it must plead enough facts to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  A claim is facially plausible when it 
“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In considering whether a claim satisfies this standard, the court must “accept factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.”  Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marines Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 
2008).  However, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to 
avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”  Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
A court may “reject, as implausible, allegations that are too speculative to warrant further factual 
development.”  Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013). 
DISCUSSION 
 Twitter moves to dismiss on multiple grounds, but its principal argument is that plaintiffs’ 
claims are barred by section 230(c), the “protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening 
of offensive material” provision of the CDA.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  Section 230(c) contains two 
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subsections, only the first of which, section 230(c)(1), is relevant here: 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).   
While the Ninth Circuit has described the reach of section 230(c)(1) in broad terms, stating 
that it “immunizes providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content 
created by third parties,” the statute does not “create a lawless no-man’s-land on the internet.”  
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, 1164 
(9th Cir. 2008); see also Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., No. 12-56638, 2016 WL 3067995, at *6 (9th 
Cir. May 31, 2016) (noting that “the CDA does not declare a general immunity from liability 
deriving from third-party content”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Rather, separated into its 
elements, section 230(c)(1) protects from liability only (a) a provider or user of an interactive 
computer service (b) that the plaintiff seeks to treat as a publisher or speaker (c) of information 
provided by another information content provider.  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-
01 (9th Cir. 2009).   
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Twitter is an interactive computer service provider, or that the 
offending content highlighted in the FAC was provided by another information content provider.  
They dispute only the second element of Twitter’s section 230(c)(1) defense, i.e., whether they 
seek to treat Twitter as a publisher or speaker. 
 The prototypical cause of action seeking to treat an interactive computer service provider 
as a publisher or speaker is defamation.  See, e.g., Internet Brands, Inc., 2016 WL 3067995, at *4; 
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101.2  However, “the language of the statute does not limit its application to 
defamation cases.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101.  Courts have applied section 230(c)(1) against a 
                                                 
2 Congress enacted section 230(c)(1) in part to respond to a New York state court decision, 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), 
finding that an internet service provider could be held liable for defamation based on third-party 
content posted on its message boards.  See Internet Brands, 2016 WL 3067995, at *5; Barnes, 570 
F.3d at 1101; Roomates, 521 F.3d at 1163. 
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variety of claims, including negligent undertaking, id. at 1102-03, intentional assault, Klayman v. 
Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357-60 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and violation of anti-sex-trafficking laws, 
Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18-24 (1st Cir. 2016).  “[W]hat matters is not 
the name of the cause of action – defamation versus negligence versus intentional infliction of 
emotional distress – [but] whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the 
defendant as the publisher or speaker of content provided by another.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-
02 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[C]ourts must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff 
alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or 
speaker.  If it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Twitter contends that plaintiffs seek to hold it liable as the publisher of content created by 
ISIS.  Mot. at 14-16 (Dkt. No. 27).  It highlights the opening paragraph of the FAC – i.e., that 
Twitter “knowingly permitted [ISIS] to use its social network as a tool for spreading extremist 
propaganda, raising funds and attracting new recruits,” FAC ¶ 1 – and the numerous descriptions 
in the FAC of content created and disseminated by ISIS through the Twitter platform.  According 
to Twitter, plaintiffs’ claims are based on Twitter’s alleged failure to exclude this third-party 
content, a quintessential responsibility of a publisher.  See Mot. at 14-16; see also Klayman, 753 
F.3d at 1359 (“the very essence of publishing is making the decision whether to print or retract a 
given piece of content”); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (“decisions 
relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content [are] actions quintessentially related 
to a publisher’s role”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170-71 
(noting that section 230(c)(1) applies to “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether 
to exclude material that third parties seek to post online,” and that “determin[ing] whether or not 
to prevent [the] posting” of material by third parties is “precisely the kind of activity” covered by 
the statute); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (“the exclusion of ‘publisher’ 
liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose 
among proffered material”). 
 Plaintiffs make two arguments in response.  First, they contend that their claims are not 
based on “the contents of tweets, the issuing of tweets, or the failure to remove tweets,” but rather 
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on Twitter’s “provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS in the first place.”  Oppo. at 3 (Dkt. No. 31).  
In other words, “[b]ecause the creation of a Twitter account necessarily occurs before the issuing 
of tweets from that account, and separately from the creation of published content, [Twitter’s] 
violations of the ATA cannot be accurately characterized as publishing activity, but rather as the 
provision of the means through which ISIS spreads its poison.”  Id. at 4.  Plaintiffs further explain 
that 
[Twitter’s] liability does not arise out of its publishing conduct, but 
rather its separate legal duty under the ATA not to provide terrorists 
with material support . . . Indeed, plaintiffs’ claims do not require 
publishing or speaking as a critical element. In no sense was 
[Twitter] acting as a publisher when it permitted ISIS members to 
sign up for and create these accounts. It was not reviewing, revising, 
or editing content. Nor was it deciding whether content should be 
publicly disseminated or withdrawn from the internet. Plaintiffs’ 
claims are not based on a theory that any particular tweets from ISIS 
members should have been altered or restricted in any way. 
Plaintiffs’ claims under the ATA are not based on offending content 
at all. They are based on Twitter’s provision of material support to 
ISIS, which is separate and apart from – and antecedent to – the 
publication of any content. Even if ISIS had never issued a single 
tweet, [Twitter’s] provision of material support to ISIS in the form 
of Twitter accounts would constitute a violation of the ATA. 
Id. at 7-8 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).  
 Second, plaintiffs highlight their allegations regarding Twitter’s Direct Messaging 
capabilities and assert that “[b]ecause these private messages are not published . . . , a lawsuit 
based on their content is not barred by the CDA.”  Id. at 2.  Plaintiffs assert that publishing under 
the CDA “necessarily involves the dissemination of information to the public” and thus does not 
encompass the transmission of private messages through Direct Messaging.  Id. at 9-11.  
I. PROVISION OF ACCOUNTS THEORY 
 There are at least three problems with plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory.  The first is 
that it does not align with the allegations in the FAC.  Those allegations describe a theory of 
liability based on Twitter’s knowing failure to prevent ISIS from disseminating content through 
the Twitter platform, not its mere provision of accounts to ISIS. 
To be sure, there are some allegations in the FAC concerning Twitter’s provision of 
accounts to ISIS.  For example, plaintiffs highlight their allegations that: (1) “[s]ince first 
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appearing on Twitter in 2010, ISIS accounts on Twitter have grown at an astonishing rate,” FAC ¶ 
3; (2) as of December 2014, ISIS had approximately 70,000 Twitter accounts and posted at least 
90 tweets per minute, id. ¶ 6; (3) Al-Furqan, ISIS’s official media wing, “maintained a . . . Twitter 
page where it posted messages from ISIS leadership as well as videos and images of beheadings 
and other brutal . . . executions to 19,000 followers,” id. ¶ 3; (4) Al-Hayat Media Center, ISIS’s 
official public relations group, maintained “at least a half dozen Twitter accounts emphasizing the 
recruitment of Westerners” and had nearly 20,000 followers as of June 2014, id. ¶ 4; (5) ISIS 
“reaches potential recruits by maintaining accounts on Twitter so that individuals across the globe 
may reach out to [it] directly,” id. ¶ 20; (6) “[e]ven when Twitter shuts down an ISIS-linked 
account, it does nothing to stop it from springing right back up” with a different but nearly 
identical name, id. ¶ 69; and (7) while Twitter has now instituted a rule prohibiting threats of 
violence and the promotion of terrorism, “many ISIS-themed accounts are still easily found on 
Twitter.com,” id. ¶ 70.   
Plaintiffs characterize these allegations as “focus[ed] on [Twitter’s] provision of . . . 
accounts to ISIS, not the content of the tweets.”  Oppo. at 4.  But with the exception of the 
statement that “ISIS accounts on Twitter have grown at an astonishing rate,” FAC ¶ 3, all of the 
allegations are accompanied by information regarding the ISIS-related content disseminated from 
the accounts.  Plaintiffs allege not just that ISIS had approximately 70,000 Twitter accounts, but 
that ISIS used those accounts to post at least 90 tweets per minute, id. ¶ 6; not just that Al-Furqan 
maintained a Twitter page, but that it maintained one “where it posted messages from ISIS 
leadership as well as videos and images of beheadings and other brutal . . . executions to 19,000 
followers,” id. ¶ 3; not just that Twitter failed to stop an ISIS-linked account from “springing right 
back up,” but that an inflammatory message was tweeted from this account following the shooting 
attack in San Bernadino, California in December 2015, id. ¶ 69.  
The rest of the FAC is likewise riddled with detailed descriptions of ISIS-related messages, 
images, and videos disseminated through Twitter and the harms allegedly caused by the 
dissemination of that content.  The FAC also includes a number of allegations specifically faulting 
Twitter for failing to detect and prevent the dissemination of ISIS-related content through the 
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 47   Filed 08/10/16   Page 8 of 15
 9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tr
ic
t o
f 
C
al
if
or
ni
a 
Twitter platform.  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 60 (Twitter “failed to respond to pleas to shut down clear 
incitements to violence”), 66 (Twitter “does not actively monitor and will not censor user 
content”).  Indeed, the opening paragraph of the FAC could not be more clear about the content-
based theory underlying plaintiffs’ claims: 
Twitter has knowingly permitted . . . ISIS to use its social network 
as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and 
attracting new recruits. This material support has been instrumental 
to the rise of ISIS and has enabled it to carry out numerous terrorist 
attacks, including the November 9, 2015 shooting attack in Amman, 
Jordan in which [Fields and  Creach] were killed.  
Id. ¶ 1 (emphasis added).  In the following paragraph, plaintiffs allege that ISIS “has exploited 
social media, most notoriously Twitter, to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world 
and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization,” and that ISIS has been able to use Twitter “to 
exert an outsized impact on how the world perceives it, by disseminating images of graphic 
violence (including the beheading of Western journalists and aid workers) . . . while using social 
media to attract new recruits and inspire lone actor attacks.”  Id. ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
In short, the theory of liability alleged in the FAC is not that Twitter provides material 
support to ISIS by providing it with Twitter accounts, but that Twitter does so by “knowingly 
permitt[ing] [ISIS] to use [those accounts] as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising 
funds, and attracting new recruits.”  Id. ¶ 1.  Plaintiffs do not dispute that this theory seeks to treat 
Twitter as a publisher and is barred by section 230(c)(1).  See, e.g., Oppo. at 2. 
The second problem with plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory is that, even if it were 
alleged in the FAC, it would be just as barred by section 230(c)(1) as the theory plaintiffs’ actually 
have alleged.  As noted above, courts have repeatedly described publishing activity under section 
230(c)(1) as including decisions about what third-party content may be posted online.  See, e.g., 
Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359 (“the very essence of publishing is making the decision whether to 
print or retract a given piece of content”); MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420 (“decisions relating to the 
monitoring, screening, and deletion of content [are] actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s 
role”); Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1170-71 (“determin[ing] whether or not to prevent [the] 
posting” of third-party material online is “precisely the kind of activity” covered by the CDA); 
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Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (“the exclusion of ‘publisher’ liability necessarily precludes liability for 
exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material”).  Plaintiffs’ 
provision of accounts theory is slightly different, in that it is based on Twitter’s decisions about 
whether particular third parties may have Twitter accounts, as opposed to what particular third-
party content may be posted.  But it is not clear to me why this difference matters for the purposes 
of section 230(c)(1).  Under either theory, the alleged wrongdoing is the decision to permit third 
parties to post content – it is just that under plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory, Twitter would 
be liable for granting permission to post (through the provision of Twitter accounts) instead of for 
allowing postings that have already occurred.  Plaintiffs do not explain why this difference means 
that the provision of accounts theory seeks to treat Twitter as something other than a publisher of 
third-party content, and I am not convinced that it does.  Despite being based on Twitter accounts 
instead of tweets, the theory is still based on Twitter’s alleged violation of a “duty . . . derive[d] 
from [its] status or conduct as a publisher.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.  
A recent First Circuit case, Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 
2016), adds further support to this conclusion.  The plaintiffs, each of whom had been a victim of 
sex trafficking, sued the defendant website provider under the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act, asserting that the defendant had violated the statute through various “choices 
[it] ha[d] made about the posting standards for advertisements,” including “the lack of controls on 
the display of phone numbers, the option to anonymize email addresses, [and the] acceptance of 
anonymous payments.”  Id. at 20.  The plaintiffs argued that “these choices are distinguishable 
from publisher functions.”  Id.  The First Circuit disagreed, holding that section 230(c)(1) “extends 
to the formulation of precisely the sort of website policies and practices [the plaintiffs] assail.”  Id.  
The court explained that decisions regarding the “structure and operation of [a] website” – such as 
“permitt[ing] users to register under multiple screen names” and other decisions regarding 
“features that are part and parcel of the overall design and operation of the website” – “reflect 
choices about what content can appear on the website and in what form” and thus “fall within the 
purview of traditional publisher functions.”  Id. at 20-21.   
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Likewise, here, Twitter’s decisions to structure and operate itself as a “platform . . . 
allow[ing] for the freedom of expression [of] hundreds of millions of people around the world,” 
FAC ¶ 65, and to allow even ISIS to “sign up for accounts on its social network,” Oppo. at 3, 
“reflect choices about what [third-party] content can appear on [Twitter] and in what form,” 
Backpage, 817 F.3d at 21.  Where such choices form the basis of a plaintiff’s claim, section 
230(c)(1) applies.  Id. 
Plaintiffs attempt to liken the provision of accounts theory to the promissory estoppel 
claim raised in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., but the facts of that case are substantially different.  The 
plaintiff in Barnes sued Yahoo on the ground that she had relied on its promise that it would 
remove explicit photographs her ex-boyfriend had posted online without her consent.  570 F.3d at 
1098-99.  The Ninth Circuit found that this promissory estoppel claim was not precluded by 
section 230(c)(1) because the plaintiff did not “seek to hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker 
of third-party content, but rather as the counterparty to a contract, as a promisor who has 
breached.”  Id. at 1107.  In other words, the plaintiff’s theory of liability was based not on 
Yahoo’s “publishing conduct,” but rather on its “manifest intention to be legally obligated to do 
something.”  Id.  By contrast, plaintiffs here assert no theory based on contract liability and allege 
no promise made or breached by Twitter.  Barnes does not indicate that the conduct underlying the 
provision of accounts theory is beyond the scope of publishing conduct. 
Plaintiffs also rely on Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., which the Ninth Circuit decided shortly 
before oral argument in this case.3  Again, that case involves a substantially different set of facts 
from this one.  The plaintiff there sued the defendant website operator for negligent failure to 
warn, alleging that the defendant knowingly failed to warn her that two individuals were using the 
website to identify and lure rape victims.  2016 WL 3067995, at *2-3.  Although the plaintiff had 
posted information on the website, the two individuals had not.  Id.  In holding that the plaintiff 
did not seek to hold the defendant liable as a publisher of third-party content, the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that her negligent failure to warn claim  
                                                 
3 Twitter submitted a Statement of Recent Decision regarding the opinion.  Dkt. No. 34.  
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would not require [the defendant] to remove any user content or 
otherwise affect how it publishes or monitors such content . . . Any 
alleged obligation to warn could have been satisfied without changes 
to the content posted by the website’s users and without conducting 
a detailed investigation. [The defendant] could have given a warning 
to . . . users, perhaps by posting a notice on the website or by 
informing users by email what it knew about the activities of [the 
individuals]. Posting or emailing such a warning could be deemed 
an act of publishing information, but section 230(c)(1) bars only 
liability that treats a website as a publisher or speaker of content 
provided by somebody else . . . A post or email warning that [the 
defendant] generated would involve only content that [the 
defendant] itself produced. 
Id. at *4.  Plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory, on the other hand, has nothing to do with 
information Twitter itself should have posted online.  Moreover, it would significantly affect 
Twitter’s monitoring and publication of third-party content by effectively requiring Twitter to 
police and restrict its provision of Twitter accounts.  Internet Brands, like Barnes, does not help 
plaintiffs’ case. 
The third problem with the provision of accounts theory is that plaintiffs have not 
adequately alleged causation.  Although the parties dispute the exact formulation of the 
appropriate causal test for civil liability under the ATA, they agree that the statute requires a 
showing of proximate causation.  See Mot. at 20-23; Oppo. at 13-16; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) 
(authorizing a suit for damages by “[a]ny national of the United States injured . . . by reason of an 
act of international terrorism”) (emphasis added); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 
F.3d 118, 123-25 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of ATA claims for failure to 
plausibly allege proximate causation); Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94-98 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(same). 
Even under plaintiffs’ proposed “substantial factor” test, see Oppo. at 13, the allegations in 
the FAC do not support a plausible inference of proximate causation between Twitter’s provision 
of accounts to ISIS and the deaths of Fields and Creach.  The only arguable connection between 
Abu Zaid and Twitter identified in the FAC is that Abu Zaid’s brother told reporters that Abu Zaid 
had been very moved by ISIS’s horrific execution of al-Kassasbeh, which ISIS publicized through 
Twitter.  See FAC ¶ 84.  That connection is tenuous at best regardless of the particular theory of 
liability plaintiffs decide to assert.  But the connection is particularly weak under the provision of 
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accounts theory because it is based on specific content disseminated through Twitter, not the mere 
provision of Twitter accounts.   
The rest of plaintiffs’ arguments and allegations with respect to proximate causation are 
similarly content-based.  For example, plaintiffs assert that Twitter’s provision of material support 
to ISIS proximately caused the deaths of Fields and Creach because Twitter has (1) “permitted 
ISIS to use its social network ‘as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and 
attracting new recruits,’” Oppo. at 15 (quoting FAC ¶ 1); (2) “g[i]ve[n] ISIS access to its Direct 
Messaging capabilities, which [ISIS] has used for ‘covert signaling’ as well as ‘fundraising and 
operational purposes,’” id. (quoting FAC ¶ 21); (3) allowed ISIS to use Twitter “to recruit more 
than 30,000 foreign fighters,” id. (citing FAC ¶ 29); (4) allowed ISIS to use Twitter “to raise 
untold sums from its supporters around the world,” id. at 15-16 (citing FAC ¶¶ 21-22, 30-34); and 
(5) “enabled ISIS to effectuate one of the most . . . effective propaganda campaigns in history,” id. 
at 16 (citing FAC ¶¶ 35-47).  Nowhere in their opposition brief or FAC do plaintiffs explain how 
Twitter’s mere provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS – conduct that allegedly created liability 
before “the publication of any content” and would support liability “[e]ven if ISIS had never 
issued a single tweet,” Oppo. at 7-8 – proximately caused the November 2015 shooting. 
On the one hand, this underscores the conclusion stated above, i.e., that plaintiffs have not 
actually alleged a theory based on Twitter’s mere provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS.  On the 
other hand, it highlights that, even assuming that plaintiffs have asserted such a theory, they have 
not plausibly alleged the causal connection necessary to support it.4  Plaintiffs’ claims based on 
the provision of accounts theory are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.    
II. DIRECT MESSAGING THEORY 
 Plaintiffs’ other attempt to evade section 230(c)(1) is based on Twitter’s Direct Messaging 
capabilities, which allow for the sending of private messages through the Twitter platform.  Oppo. 
                                                 
4 While courts have not required plaintiffs bringing ATA claims based on material support 
theories to “trace specific dollars to specific attacks,” Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. 
Supp. 2d 414, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); accord Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 328 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (on appeal), they have nevertheless rejected alleged causal connections that are 
too speculative or attenuated to raise a plausible inference of proximate causation, Terrorist 
Attacks, 714 F.3d at 123-25; Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 94-98. 
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at 9-11.  Plaintiffs contend that publishing activity under section 230(c)(1) “necessarily involves 
the dissemination of information to the public” and thus does not encompass the transmission of 
private messages through Direct Messaging.  Id.  In support of their Direct Messaging theory, 
plaintiffs abandon all pretense of a content-less basis for liability and assert instead that ISIS has 
“used [Direct Messaging] to its great advantage,” specifically, to contact and communicate with 
potential recruits.  Id. at 10; see also FAC ¶¶ 20-22.  
 I am not persuaded that publishing activity under section 230(c)(1) does not extend to 
Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities.  As noted above, Congress enacted section 230(c)(1) in 
part to respond to a New York state court decision finding that an internet service provider could 
be held liable for defamation based on third-party content posted on its message boards.  See, e.g., 
Roomates, 521 F.3d at 1163.  In defamation law, the term “publication” means “communication 
[of the defamatory matter] intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person 
defamed.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Fourth Circuit has 
held that an internet service provider covered by the “traditional definition” of publisher is 
protected by section 230(c)(1).  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(explaining that “every repetition of a defamatory statement is considered a publication,” and 
“every one who takes part in the publication is charged with publication”) (internal quotation 
marks and alterations omitted).  And while the Ninth Circuit has declined to construe “the reach of 
section 230(c)(1) [as] fastened . . . tightly to the nuances of defamation law,” the court has also 
indicated that the statute’s protections extend at least as far as the “treat[ment] [of] internet service 
providers as publishers . . . for the purposes of defamation.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104.  Under this 
analysis, the private nature of Direct Messaging does not remove the transmission of such 
messages from the scope of publishing activity under section 230(c)(1).  
 Neither of the two decisions cited by plaintiffs calls for a different result.  In Batzel, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed what it means for content to be “provided” by a third party, not what it 
means to “publish” third-party content online.  See 333 F.3d at 1032-35.  In F.T.C. v. Accusearch, 
Inc., No. 06-cv-00105, 2007 WL 4356786 (D. Wyo. Sept. 28, 2007), the court found that the 
defendants were not being treated as publishers where “the only parties that had access to the 
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phone records at issue were [the defendants] and the particular [customer] that [purchased them].”  
Id. at *4.  The court emphasized the “ill-gotten” nature of the phone records, and the commercial 
nature of the defendants’ use of them.  Id.  It also observed that the “argument [that defendants are 
being treated as publishers] might be more persuasive if the FTC sought to hold liable an internet 
service provider who, by virtue of the email-hosting services [it] provide[s], merely delivered an 
email containing ill-gotten consumer phone records.”  Id. *5 (emphasis added).  That, of course, is 
essentially the situation here. 
 Meanwhile, a number of courts have applied the CDA to bar claims predicated on a 
defendant’s transmission of nonpublic messages, and have done so without questioning whether 
the CDA applies in such circumstances.  See Hung Tan Phan v. Lang Van Pham, 182 Cal. App. 
4th 323, 324-28 (2010); Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 795-96, 804-08 
(2006); Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528, 536-37 (D. Md. 2006).   
 Apart from the private nature of Direct Messaging, plaintiffs identify no other way in 
which their Direct Messaging theory seeks to treat Twitter as anything other than a publisher of 
information provided by another information content provider.  Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims 
based on this theory are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.   
CONCLUSION 
 Twitter’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.  Plaintiffs shall file their second amended 
complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order.   
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: August 10, 2016 
______________________________________ 
WILLIAM H. ORRICK 
United States District Judge 
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